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ABSTRACT
The US Air Force (USAF) has evolved a policy for the
acquisition of fighter jet engines (FJE). In the 1970s and
1980s that policy placed a premium on FJE
performance primarily measured by the metric:
thrust/engine weight. In the 1990s, the USAF policy
changed from an emphasis on performance to reduced
life-cycle cost with a premium on sustainment. This
paper reports the results of a study of how the USAF
and Corporation Alpha (Alpha) have adapted their
processes, practices, and policies to design, develop,
manufacture, test, and sustain a family of FJEs. Each
member of the family of FJEs is sequentially linked
relative to insertion of technology designed to reduce
sustainment costs.
In addition to the technology linkages, the
development of the family of FJEs selected for this case
study is also tracked relative to US Department of
Defense and USAF policy and industry design, build,
and maintain processes, methods, and tools. This paper
discerns the complex, highly integrated manner that
characterizes the interaction between (1) technology, (2)
policy, and (3) manufacturing and sustainment tools to
produce a family of FJEs with improving sustainment
qualities and non-degrading performance.
The metric Unscheduled Engine Removals (UER) per
1000 Effective Flight Hours  (UER/1000EFH) is used to
compare the sustainability of each member of the
selected family of FJEs. Our results are based on data
obtained through a series of field interviews of USAF
and civilian government personnel and Alpha personnel.
The US government extensive database containing
UER information is the primary source of MRO trends
for the FJEs of this study. Our analysis shows that the
family of FJEs sustainability, as measured by the UER
metric, has not improved beyond 610  EFH for each
succeeding generation in the selected FJE family. We
conjecture that upstream policy, technology insertion,
and manufacturing and sustainment tools are not the
primary determinants of sustainability; the manner in
which the FJE is used has the greatest influence on
sustainability of FJEs.
INTRODUCTION
During fiscal year 1999, the United States Air Force
was authorized to use over 24 billion dollars toward the
operation and maintenance of its equipment1, an
amount representing over 30% of the total Air Force
budget.  Tremendous operations and maintenance
expenditures such as these have led the Air Force to
launch investigations into what characteristics allow the
most efficient usage of equipment and funds. One
attribute being investigated is system sustainability, a
characteristic that helps determine how much effort and
money aerospace system owners mploy to operate and
maintain their systems. This paper examines the efforts
of an American aerospace company to employ
sustainment ideals and how those efforts have impacted
system owners and maintainers.  The conclusions
presented in this paper are heavily based on case
studies conducted on a series of Air Force fighter engine
systems produced by an anonymous major American
aerospace manufacturer, which shall be referred to as
Corporation Alpha.  The engine systems studied have
been given the aliases EG10-1, EG10-2, EG10-5, and
EG10-9, and will be collectively called the EG10 engine
family.
Over the last decade, the Air Force has had to adapt
its fleet of hundreds of aircraft and its operations
infrastructure to a drastically changing world and
staggering technical advancement.  Additionally, Air
Force aircraft are being called upon to complete a
greater number of mission types while military budgets
over the past decade have decreased2. Because of the
billions of dollars spent annually, aerospace system
operations and maintenance costs have been
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2highlighted as a prime place to increase efficiency and
cut costs.
The billions of dollars spent each year to sustain the
Air Force's aerospace systems is the primary motivation
for this paper.  Information will be presented to provide
the aerospace industry and the US Air Force with
guidance on how to best design systems for minimized
sustainability costs.
Another motivation for this paper results from the high
pace of technical development within the aerospace
industry thus introducing a need for upgradability in
aerospace systems. Upgradability is a characteristic that
refers to how much effort, whether in money or man-
hours, a system requires to have its capabilities
improved (i.e. sustainability or overall performance) or
have new capabilities added (i.e. ability to use another
type of missile system).  This paper seeks to provide the
aerospace industry and the Air Force with information
on how to design systems to make future upgrades
affordable.
The third motivation stems from problems
encountered while locating replacement parts for older
aerospace systems. Manufacturers discontinue needed
parts for military systems because it becomes
unprofitable to continue manufacturing the parts when
the only buyer is the military, which only purchases the
minimum number of parts necessary.  Similar problems
occur when a part manufacturer goes out of business.
Either of these situations leaves the military in an
undesirable and expensive position, which usually
results in having the part custom produced as needed in
low volume and at very high cost.  Through research
and data analysis, this paper will show that some of the
problems created by parts obsolescence can be
mitigated.
In the context of the above environment, the
objectives of this paper is to show that designing early
for lean sustainment results in more affordable and agile
life cycle options, and a greater flexibility for technical
upgrades throughout the operational lifetime of a
system. Information and analysis will be used to
illustrate whether a system initially designed to
incorporate sustainment concepts will demonstrate
significant positive effects to members in that system's
value stream - referring to the people and organizations
involved with the entire life cycle of the system.  More
affordable and agile life cycle options include issues
ranging from determining where a system will undergo
major depot maintenance to how many technicians are
required to fulfill the system's day-to-day maintenance.
Flexibility for technical upgrades refers to the overall
ability for a system to undergo improvements in some
facet of its performance and/ormaintenance.
To attain these objectives, five key research questions
were developed to guide the research:
1. What does designing an aerospace system for
sustainability entail?
2. What are the key design tools and processes
utilized in designing an aerospace system for
sustainability?
3. What impact does designing an aerospace system
for sustainment have on all the agents in the
system's value stream?
4. What are the enablers and barriers impacting
designing aerospace systems for sustainability?
5. How does designing an aerospace system for
sustainability impact the upgradability of that
system?
Through these questions, the information collected and
analysis conducted will be presented to the reader thus
exploring how designing for lean sustainment impacts
the operations and cost of ownership of the system.
The research methodology presented in this paper is
modeled after work completed in the MIT Lean
Sustainment Initiative and Lean Aircraft Initiative with
modifications made relating to this specific research
topic.  Based on these examples, the research
conducted for this paper featured a literature search,
development of a research framework, selection of
relevant case studies, and arrangement of the data.
The literature search stage focused on researching the
history and trends of Air Force procurement policies.
Following initial literature searches, a series of expert
interviews were conducted among people within the
aerospace industry, the Air Force, and MIT.
After completion of the literature search and the expert
interviews, the case studies were selected.  The EG10
engine family was selected because these systems had
been created in quantities large enough that statistical
data became relevant, upgraded versions of these
systems were created every four to five years, and
because data derived from studies of these engines
would be of extreme benefit to the Air Force.
Table 1 illustrates some of the primary characteristics
of each of the studied engine systems.  The original
EG10-1 and EG10-2 engines qualified for use within the
Air Force in October of 1973 and featured system
modularity as a primary design feature.  Modularity
allowed maintenance workers to separate different parts
of the engine (i.e. diffuser, compressor, burner, turbine,
and afterburner modules) from one another so that the
parts could be worked on independently. Corporation
Alpha improved on each version of the EG10 family’s
sustainability through incorporation of features such as
improved reliability, increased durability, and inclusion
of computerized diagnostic systems.
3DATA SEARCH
EG10 AND EG15 MAINTAINABILITY DESIGN
FEATURES - Corporation Alpha defines maintainability
as "… the quantitative and qualitative system design
influence employed to ensure ease and economy of
maintenance and to reduce out-of-service time required
for scheduled and unscheduled maintenance.3"
Through the EG10 Maintainability Design Group,
Corporation Alpha has endeavored to institute this
definition into the EG10 engine family.  Creation of this
engineering group was mandated to improve the overall
sustainment performance of the EG10-1 and EG10-2
engine systems after the Air Force expressed
dissatisfaction with the system, and instituted
competition to provide a replacement for the contract in
the late 1970s and early 1980s.   Through the
experiences gleaned through this competition and the
lessons learned from constant improvements to EG10
engines, Corporation Alpha has become a firm believer
in sustainability.  In their opinion, as long as a sufficient
supporting infrastructure exists, systems designed
effectively for sustainability will see savings in overall
cost and manpower plus a more efficient sustainment
pipeline.  Sustainable engines demonstrate the
characteristics of durability, survivability (surviving
handling by maintenance technicians and the rigors of
warfare), maintainability, reliability, reparability, and
affordability.
Advances in available technology have greatly
contributed to the increased sustainability of Corporation
Alpha’s systems. Through its tremendously increased
thrust performance and incorporation of modular
components the first EG10 engines demonstrated the
cutting edge of engine technology. Fighter engine
systems, however, represent extremely difficult systems
to make sustainable because of their extremely harsh
performance and operating requirements. The
placement of Line-Replaceable-Units (LRU) and metrics
such as Maintenance Man-Hours (MMH) and Mean
Time to Removal represent methods of evaluating
sustainability in fighter engines.  Additionally, durability
metrics such as individual part failure rates and number
of removals also help measure sustainability.  These
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metrics help drive advancements in technology that
produce more durable materials, better thermodynamic
models, and implementations of on-board diagnostic
systems that lead to greater overall system
sustainability.
Corporation Alpha has developed a number of
processes and tools to aid the incorporation of
sustainability into its systems.  Some of these
developments have been guided by military directives
such as Designing and Developing Maintainable
Products and Systems - MIL-HND-470A4, which
describes the processes that should be utilized to make
new military systems maintainable, but other
developments stemmed from internally produced
mandates such as Corporation Alpha’s Design Manual
for Maintainability/Human Engineering.  System
sustainability is aided by computer-based tools such as
Transom-Jack/Jane, stereo-lithography, and CATIA to
help them design their systems for maintainability and
older tools such as wooden system mock-ups.  Many of
these same tools help develop upgraded systems that
are more transparent to users and maintainers of the
aerospace system.  One of the most impressive tools
used by Corporation Alpha is their extensive Lessons
Learned database.  This database is accessible to
engineers throughout the company intranet and provides
them with knowledge from the many design projects that
Corporation Alpha has participated in, thus allowing
engineers to easily examine how design and operations
problems have been solved in the past.
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Engine Completed
Military
Qualifications
Maximum
Thrust
Number in
USAF
Inventory
Cost per
Engine
(millions)
Maintainability
Innovation
Effective Flight
Hours per
Month
EG10-1 1973 23830 1579 2.65 21
EG10-2 1973 23830 1094 2.67
Modularity
25
EG10-5 1985 23770 1155 3.27 Increased
Durability and
Reliability
24
EG10-9 1989 29000 244 5.2 Computerized
Diagnostic
40
TABLE 1: EG10 Engine Family Characteristics1
4EG10 AND EG15 AIR FORCE MANAGEMENT -
Case studies were conducted of the EG10 Engine
Family Field Support Office (EG10 FSO) at Wright
Patterson Air Force Base (WPAFB) to discover the Air
Force’s assessment of the sustainability performance of
Corporation Alpha’s products. A stark contrast in opinion
between Air Force personnel and those at Corporation
Alpha was quickly discovered.  Where Corporation
Alpha personnel stated that EG10 engines
demonstrated good sustainability that was continuously
improved upon, EG10 FSO personnel stated that the
early EG10 engines initially demonstrated horrendous
sustainment performance and that even the relatively
modern EG10-9 demonstrated less than satisfactory
sustainment performance. Through a series of
upgrades, the earlier EG10-1 and EG10-2 engines have
greatly increased their sustainment performance, but
only to the point of remaining competitive with other
engine systems.
The Air Force personnel interviewed seemed to
believe that lean sustainment ideas could cut Air Force
engine maintenance system costs without loss of
service, but only if implemented correctly.  Otherwise, it
would remove the maintainer’s ability to react to
previously undiscovered failure modes that occur in the
normal operation of the engine.   Air Force personnel
have already seen the results of drastic Air Force
maintenance policy changes.  During development of
the EG10-1 and EG10-2 engine systems, the Air Force
mainly considered engine sustainability and
upgradability after it was already constructed and in the
field.   However, during development of the EG10-5 and
EG10-9 engines, the Air Force has taken a more active
role in determining how best to design engine systems
for sustainment and in determining how the engine
system will be used through out its life cycle.
Additionally, the relationship between Corporation Alpha
and the Air Force changed from a distrustful and distant
producer/customer relationship to a relationship of
cooperation focused on producing the best product
possible.
Members of the EG10 FSO state that the most
important technical innovation by Corporation Alpha in
terms of engine sustainability was its development of
engine modularity.  This feature allows only parts of the
engine to be sent off to depot and then be replaced with
another module of that type thus providing maintainers
with increased flexibility in how they maintain the engine
system.  Other technical innovations include increased
refinement in how LRUs are positioned through analysis
of individual part failure rates and accessibility
requirements thus cutting MMH metrics.  Also, engine
systems have been designed with borescopes that allow
technicians to examine parts of the engine without
disassembling the engine and sometimes without even
removing the engine from the aircraft.
Perhaps the strongest message communicated by the
EG10 FSO was the importance of previous experiences
to those managing an engine system.  Through previous
operational experience, maintainers are able to identify
failure modes and prepare for the appearance of these
failure modes in the rest of the engine fleet.  Programs
such as the Pacer engine program and the Accelerated
Mission Test (AMT) program are focused on predicting
and observing how engine systems behave over their
operational lifetime.
The importance of such knowledge became extremely
apparent through of difficulties that arose in maintaining
the EG10-9 engine.  Unlike its predecessors, the EG10-
9 was purchased in much smaller numbers and over a
relatively short three-year period.  Because of this, the
EG10-9 engine fleet gains flight hours significantly
faster than other EG10 engines.  The Pacer program,
which runs a number of engines well ahead of the rest of
the engine fleet to identify failure modes, is unable to
stay ahead of the rest of the fleet because by the time
the failure mode is identified and diagnosed, the rest of
the fleet is experiencing that failure mode.  Moreover,
the fleet experiences the failure almost simultaneously,
adding to the maintainability difficulties.
There has also been debate within the Air Force as to
the best process to diagnose the maintenance needs of
engines.  Reliability Centered Maintenance determines
engine system maintenance and replacement schedules
through analysis of statistical and performance data
collected from tests conducted during the development
of the engine and from other engines already
operational within the Air Force.  However On Condition
Maintenance, which dominated maintenance for the
EG10-1, EG10-2, and EG10-5 engines, focused on
using inspections to determine how maintenance for an
engine system is scheduled.  Conclusions have yet to
be drawn as to which system is superior.
DATA ANALYSIS
This section provides an analysis of data concerning
the policy, technology, processes and tools, and results
of Air Force and Corporation Alpha efforts to develop
the EG10 engine family.  The data presented in the
following sections was derived from analysis of case
studies; numerical data collected from personnel at
Kelly AFB in San Antonio, Texas; and literature sources.
Figure 1 illustrates some significant events and policy
changes occurring between the 1960s and the beginning
of year 2000 that impacted the design and maintenance
of EG10 engine systems.  Figure 1 illustrates elements
of engine sustainment policy, technology, processes and
tools, and results, and how those same elements
impacted the entire engine sustainment infrastructure.
For example, one can easily see that the EG10-1 and
EG10-2 engines were developed and used when
sequential engineering methodologies were prevalent
and the Air Force still implemented non-sustainment
focused ideology.  Additionally, dotted links have been
used to highlight points where events in the results
section have impacted events in the policy section.
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Figure 1: Research Framework Flow Chart
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6The information provided in Figure 1 is expanded
upon throughout the remainder of this section.  These
detailed descriptions illustrate how given events
impacted the EG10 development processes thus
providing a more detailed understanding of how the
topics presented throughout this paper intertwine with
current Air Force and Corporation Alpha sustainment
policies and practices.
COMPONENT IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM - During
the 1960's, the Component Improvement Program (CIP)
was created to address maintainability and reliability
problems that were recognized after an engine system
was deployed.  CIP resources were only to be used to
fund small engine component improvements - in
essence CIP was only meant to fund engine upgrades5.
In reality, however, CIP money was utilized for projects
that were so extensive that they were practically full
development projects.  Congress saw this usage of CIP
funding as a way to avoid their oversight of new engine
developments since CIP funding was a bulk annual
allotment used at the Air Force’s discretion. To
reestablish its oversight, Congress restructured the CIP
to limit the scale of projects that could be funded without
prior congressional approval.
Despite Congress's restructuring efforts, the CIP
program has still been utilized throughout the EG10
program to fund many needed improvements.  These
improvements have included reorganizing the
placement of LRUs in order to simplify maintenance
tasks and replacing various components with more
reliable and durable equipment. The usage of over $681
million CIP dollars within the EG10-1 and EG10-2
programs clearly illustrates the value of the CIP
program.
ENGINE MODEL DERIVATIVE PROGRAM - The
Engine Model Derivative Program (EMDP) was put
forward by Congress in 1968 to correct what it saw as
misuse of CIP funds while still providing means to
conduct derivative engine system research and
development6.  However, the EMDP process was very
bureaucratic and had to compete with other military
priorities before receiving approval.  Where previously
derivative engine development programs relied on CIP
funds, EMDP forced each new derivative idea in front of
Congress.  Because of the difficulty of procuring EMDP
funding, EMDP funds went largely unused until the late
1970s.
In 1978, the Air Force persuaded Congress to release
EMDP funds to aid Corporation Beta's development of
an alternate engine to the EG10-1 and EG10-2 thus
forcing Corporations Beta and Alpha to compete for the
contract to develop a better engine system for the Air
Force’s frontline fighter aircraft. By fostering
competition, both corporations developed engines
superior in performance and sustainability than the
previous EG10 engines.
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PROPULSION SYSTEM PROGRAM OFFICE  - The
Propulsion System Program Office (SPO) was
organized in 1977 in order to oversee the development
of the EG10-5 engine and its rival engine system, the
HG15-1 developed by Corporation Beta, and insure that
both competing engine systems fulfilled the Air Force's
performance and sustainability needs.  This organization
of engineers and managers was responsible for
negotiating contracts between the Air Force and engine
manufacturers while assisting manufacturers to solve
system development problems, such as system
integration issues and cost overrun.  In many ways, the
purpose of the SPO was to insure that the EG10-1's and
EG10-2's development problems did not reoccur with
the new engine systems.  The SPO also negotiated
contract disputes between Air Force and manufacturer
personnel, thus further insuring creation of a quality
product.
The majority of SPO personnel were veterans of
previous engine system development projects and were
already well acquainted with the many challenges an
engine development program faces.  This previous
experience among the team members was one of the
largest reasons for the success of the EG10-5
development program7.
One of the key motivators behind developing an
upgraded engine system was to foster competition
between Corporations Alpha and Beta.  In addition to
other duties, the SPO needed to coordinate efforts with
both corporations to insure that both engines fit basic Air
Force requirements.  The Propulsion SPO also played a
vital role in determining exactly how to divide the final
contracts for the new engines based on the results of the
final fly-off competition.
The SPO was also responsible for surveying the war
fighters in order to determine what their needs were in
terms of maintainability and performance - especially
compared to the EG10-1 and EG10-2 engines.  Some
SPO personnel had previously served with operational
fighter squadrons as technicians thus allowing them to
contribute first-hand knowledge of flight-line engine
maintenance procedures and difficulties. The SPO
maintained a close relationship with the fighter
squadrons to insure that the war fighter's interests were
communicated to the manufacturers.
ENGINE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY PROGRAM -
Established in late 1978, the Engine Structural Integrity
Program (ENSIP) is an Air Force program that focuses
on improving an engine designer's understanding of
engine system durability8. Prior to ENSIP, engine
designers possessed a less structured view of engine
system durability and had a mind set that they could
design their systems to not fail, which is not the case.
ENSIP provided "an organized and disciplined approach
to the structural design, analysis, development,
production, and life management of gas turbine engines
with the goal of ensuring engine structural safety,
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7increased service readiness, and reduced life cycle
costs.9" This was done by directing designers to perform
tasks such as identifying possible catastrophic failure
points, accurately characterizing the engine's material
properties, simulating the thermal and dynamic stresses
that the engine would undergo, and determining how the
engine's structure would interact with the aircraft and
other systems.
Once the analysis was complete, developers
engineered their systems to minimize the chances of
catastrophic failures.  In addition to lessening the risk of
these failures, this analysis also helped to provide the
system owners with data for scheduling inspections and
maintenance.  The system owners, using data gained
through ENSIP, now had a better probability of
identifying potential failures before they impacted the
system and could arrange their supply chain to provide
needed parts.  In addition, data from ENSIP provided a
framework for managing problems and enhancements
through the CIP program.    If a new mission needed to
be performed or a new material became available,
designers would utilize the information and steps from
the original ENSIP program to institute the needed
changes.  The ENSIP program brought greater
understanding to the EG10-5 development program and
can be credited with much of the R&M improvements
seen in that engine system.
IMPACT OF COMPETITION - As mentioned earlier,
the Air Force encountered multiple problems with its
EG10-1 and EG10-2 engines.  Despite the fact that
these engines satisfied all the Air Force's performance
needs, other problems outside of strict flight
performance thoroughly clouded the Air Force's opinion
of these engines.  For example, the cost of ownership
for the EG10-1 and EG10-2 was tremendous since the
engines had mainly been designed to provide high thrust
without considering sustainability.  In addition, problems
such as dangerous in-flight stall stagnations appeared
after the engine was fielded posing considerable danger
to pilots, eventually forcing flight envelope limitations.
The Air Force believed that Corporation Alpha should be
responsible for correcting the problems with the engines
while Corporation Alpha believed that the Air Force
should provide funding to repair the problems thus
creating ill will between Air Force and Corporation Alpha
officials.  To create even more problems, two
Corporation Alpha suppliers experienced labor strikes
which crippled Corporation Alpha's ability to build EG10
engines and caused great skepticism among Air Force
officials about relying on one company to provide all the
engines for its front line fighter aircraft.
Air Force officials decided to entertain proposals from
both Corporations Alpha and Beta for an engine to
replace the EG10-1 and EG10-2. Corporation Beta
leaped at the opportunity to obtain even part of the
lucrative Air Force fighter engine contract because, due
to previous events, Corporation Beta had been
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effectively shut out of the military aerospace engine
market.  In order to win the contract and foil their
competitor, both corporations designed engines that
surpassed the Air Force's requirements.  The warranties
guaranteeing that the new engines were at least twice as
durable as the earlier EG10 engines further illustrate
drastic sustainment improvements10.
Despite the fact that Corporation Beta succeeded in
procuring 75% of the 1985 development contract,
totaling 120 engines, Corporation Alpha was not
completely forced out of the fighter engine market
because the company still provided support services to
the EG10 engines it had already built for the Air Force.
In fact, Corporation Alpha later produced the EG10-9 for
an Air Force fighter/ground-attack aircraft.  Fostering
competition between these two rivals resulted in a
tremendous benefit for the Air Force, which received
superior, high-quality engine systems that addressed all
their sustainment needs at very competitive prices.
MULTISTAGE IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM - The
Multistage Improvement Program (MSIP) illustrates that
Air Force policy makers at least partially understand the
necessity of aerospace system upgradability. The MSIP
program was conceived during development of the
second-generation of Air Force dual engine fighters
between 1978 and 198611.  Although the EG10 engines
were not directly impacted through this program, the
MSIP initiative led to major upgrades in fighter fire
control systems, greater data processing ability, and
numerous radar system upgrades.
RECOMMENDATIONS ON POLICY - In response to
factors such as high aerospace system maintenance
costs and war fighter complaints, the Air Force
commissioned studies to increase understanding of how
complex military technical systems are developed.  In
the late 1970s and the early 1980s, some studies
released findings that emphasized the need for Air
Force designers and managers to increase focus on
system ownership costs, including the maintainability,
structural integrity, reliability, and durability of systems.
The 1976 recommendation by the Air Force's Scientific
Advisory Board and a 1980 recommendation given by
the Comptroller General to Congress were two
recommendations based on these studies.  These
opinions illustrate changing attitudes within the Air
Force, and the government in general, toward focusing
not just on raw system performance but also the
system's cost of ownership.
ACCELERATED MISSION TESTS - During the design
of the EG10-1 and EG10-2 engines, ground test
programs used to evaluate engine performance could
not accurately predict engine or part reliability.  First, the
ground tests were relatively short, on the order of 150
hours, in comparison to the engine's total life cycle, thus
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8yielding limited information on long-term performance.
Second, the tests were not based on how the engine
would be operated in the field. Instead, they focused on
evaluating the engine's maximum performance levels,
thus only providing information about high-cycle fatigue
characteristics. Fielded engines function at numerous
throttle settings, and often these throttle settings are
quickly and drastically changed depending on the pilot's
requirements thus making low-cycle fatigue extremely
important.
In the 1970s, Air Force propulsion SPO managers
instituted new ground tests to better simulate long-term
engine performance.  Designers used information from
active fighter squadrons to determine throttle usage for
expected mission types (e.g. air-to-ground missions, air-
to-air missions, and escort missions).  During an AMT,
the subject engine would be tested through an entire
series of throttle settings designed to simulate the cycles
it would encounter in actual service - including time
spent at maximum, intermediate, and minimum thrust
settings. AMTs are run for thousands of hours, stopping
occasionally for system repairs and evaluation, thus
duplicating operations over an engine's entire lifecycle.
Because of the varying throttle settings and the length of
the tests, AMTs accurately provide information on the
engine’s overall durability and reliability.
INTEGRATED PRODUCT TEAMS - Integrated
Product Teams (IPT) became popular within Air Force
and industry circles during the late 1980s and 1990s and
largely impacted the EG10-9 development program.
Corporation Alpha, learning from Air Force complaints
about the R&M characteristics of previous engine
systems, utilized IPTs to insure that all engine
characteristics, including flight performance,
sustainability, and durability, were designed into each of
its products.
IPTs bring together technically experienced
individuals from many different backgrounds to create
teams that are knowledgeable of all customer needs and
system characteristics.  In the case of Corporation
Alpha's products, Air Force personnel also participate in
the IPTs to better insure that Air Force needs are
satisfied.
Research also revealed that the Air Force has been
attempting to implement IPT practices.  For example, a
March 1995 Modification Planning and Management
Directive described in great detail how Air Force IPTs
should be established to guide engine modification
processes12.  It directed that the team should include
personnel such as equipment specialists, quality
assurance personnel, and financial representatives.
COMPUTER-AIDED ACQUISITION AND LOGISTICS
SUPPORT  - In 1985 and 1988 the Deputy Secretary of
Defense issued a memorandum calling for standards to
be established that would allow different military units
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and outside contractors to be able to share maintenance
and performance information electronically13. Prior to
this directive, the military and its contractors had either
relied on paper documents or stand-alone computer
systems to record system performance data and
specifications.  In order to share information with other
units, the information would either have to be
photocopied or directly inputted into the other unit's
computer system.  Either option required large amounts
of time.  Moreover, when a specification was changed,
new documents would have to be copied and
distributed.  Often, units would operate with an outdated
specification since there were significant delays in
distributing new specification documents.
The Computer-Aided Acquisition and Logistic Support
(CALS) program is an initiative that seeks to establish
the infrastructure necessary to allow military units and
contractors to share information electronically without
need for complex translation routines.  CALS defines
he standards for neutral transfer protocols that allow
different systems within and outside of the military to
communicate seamlessly14.  For example, the CALS
program defines what software system will be used to
electronically record scanned information. DoD
estimates it will have a 20%-30% savings in its
engineering, manufacturing, and support operations
through usage of CALS directives15.
CALS has already had an impact on the industries
supporting DoD. Manufacturers need to utilize CALS
protocols in order to submit design changes,
suggestions, or bids for DoD contracts. Forcing
contractors to CALS standards should also bring
benefits to large military manufacturers because they,
like the military itself, need to share large amounts of
information with different parts of their organization.
CALS directives affect aerospace system
sustainability because they will allow easy capture and
distribution of engine system data to both maintainers
and manufacturers. Ideally, a manufacturing engineer
will be able to use his or her workstation to examine the
same information that an Air Force flight-line technician
uses.
CONCURRENT ENGINEERING - During the late
1980s, concurrent engineering gained popularity as a
method of reducing production costs and increasing the
quality of complex engineering systems within civilian
industries and the military.  In the 1988 version of a
military specification, concurrent engineering was
defined as:
…a systematic approach to creating a
product design that considers all
elements of the product life cycle from
conception through disposal. In doing
so, Concurrent Engineering
simultaneously defines the product, its
manufacturing processes, and all other
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9required life cycle processes, such as
logistics support16.
Previous attempts to improve industry performance
during the 1980s focused on individual sections of the
product development process, thus lessening focus on
the project as a whole.  These methods also did not
completely solve the problems of sequential engineering
where development personnel functioned in an
assembly line fashion and focused only on their
specified tasks17.  While these efforts did lead to
improvements, they were not as significant as industry
leaders had hoped.
Concurrent engineering creates significant
improvements by ensuring that the entire product and its
lifecycle are considered during each stage of
development.  In order to achieve a successful
concurrent engineering project, the product's
development process must be extremely well
understood.   During the process, all participants must
also remain aware of how different individuals within the
new system's value stream will view the product and
insure that production requirements reflect those points
of view.  All these points of view must be combined and
traded in such a way that the important operational
characteristics are optimized - including the system's
overall cost, performance, durability, and
maintainability.
A central idea behind concurrent engineering is
thinking about the product's entire life cycle, which
naturally includes the sustainability of that product.
Concurrent engineering forces all participants to step
back from their particular facet of a project and consider
all of the goals of the system. Military and civilian
interests in concurrent engineering methods hint at the
increased importance of maintainability in current
systems.
FINDINGS - From the 1960s to the end of the 1970s
the Air Force operated under policies that, from a
modern point of view, were policies that did not
emphasize sustainability, and these non-sustainment
policies caused problems for new aerospace systems.
Often, in the rush to get a system operational, the long-
term needs of that system were overlooked making it
expensive to own and difficult to maintain.
However, technologies relating to R&M were not
pursued because it was not considered to be of vital
importance at the time.  The processes and tools used
at the time, specifically sequential engineering practices,
were also not optimized to allow consideration of the
entire system and its life cycle. It was under these
conditions the EG10-1 and EG10-2 designs evolved.
While these engines out performed anything else
available to the Air Force, initially causing high
satisfaction, their poor reliability and maintainability
coupled with a high cost of ownership eventually left the
Air Force dissatisfied.
                                              
16 Hoffman, pp. 2
17 Ellinger, pp. 421
While it still operated with anti-sustainment policies,
the Air Force did have in place mechanisms that
allowed further aerospace system development, such
as, EMDP and CIP. However, these mechanisms, at
least during most of the 1970s, were difficult to exploit
due to heavy bureaucracy.  The EMDP program existed
for nearly ten years before it was used to spur EG10-5
system development.  Before dissatisfaction with EG10-
1 and EG10-2 engines became an issue, the leadership
and vision did not exist to fully exploit programs such as
CIP and EMDP create anything but low-level EG10
improvements.
The Air Force then changed its policies to encourage
ystem sustainability as much as overall operational
performance, and, as a result, a number of changes
were made within both the Air Force and the aerospace
industry.  In the case of engine systems, the Air Force's
policy changes were initiated by instigating competition
between Corporations Alpha and Beta to design EG10-1
and EG10-2 replacements that better met Air Force
performance and sustainment needs. Due to
competition, the new engines featured increased
durability and both manufacturers made greater efforts
to understand field operation and maintenance
procedures.
Processes and tools were also augmented to allow the
creation of more sustainable systems. The Air Force
empowered organizations like the EG10 FSO to use
previous engine development experience to mitigate
future development problems. The Air Force and
Corporation Alpha also changed their relationship from
one of untrusting producers and buyers to a relationship
of partners trying to create the best engine possible.
Under these programs, the EG10-5 engines were
designed. As will be later illustrated, at least initially, the
new engine satisfied Air Force desires for a more
sustainable engine.  The EG10-5 eliminated many of the
problems suffered by the EG10-1 and EG10-2 engines
such as in flight stall stagnations and problems with the
fuel control system.  Additionally, because efforts were
made to better understand how the engine would be
utilized in the field, the squadrons using the engines
were much more satisfied.
The technical sustainment improvements made to the
EG10 engines were the results of active policy
decisions. These policy decisions were directly
influenced by strong leadership and the EG10's overall
performance.
ENGINE SUSTAINABILITY METRICS
The previous sections have concentrated on detailing
the efforts and policies that Corporation Alpha and the
Air Force have utilized to improve the R&M of their
systems. This section will utilize quantitative analysis to
illustrate the results of those efforts.
In order to quantitatively analyze the EG10 engine
family, it was necessary to collect maintainability
performance metrics. The Air Force utilizes many
metrics to gauge the reliability, maintainability, and
durability of their aerospace systems and to indirectly
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judge the performance of their flight-line technicians.
Based on information gathered, the metric Unscheduled
Engine Removals per 1000 Effective Flight Hours
(UER/1000EFH) was selected. A UER refers to
removing an engine from the aircraft for purposes other
than its regularly scheduled maintenance, such as an
unexpected engine malfunction or failure.
An engine removal indicates that flight-line
technicians were unable to perform a needed
maintenance or repair task on the engine while it was
still installed within the aircraft. Upon removal, the
engine is sent to a maintenance shop, either at the
intermediate or depot level, where the needed work can
be completed. A UER indicates when such removals
were not previously scheduled for the engine.
Intermediate and depot maintenance tasks force the
engine owner, usually an Air Force squadron, to use its
monetary resources to pay for the maintenance task,
thus adding to the life cycle cost of the engine system.
However, while engine removal indicates a need for
some level of maintenance, it is important to note that
not all engine problems require removing the engine
from the aircraft.  Another reason for selecting EG10
UER/1000EFH metrics is that this metric indicates when
the engine was not functioning inside an aircraft. The
longer an engine remains functional in the aircraft, the
greater value it has to its owner. UER/1000EFH metrics
for the Air Force's fleet of EG10 engines were provided
by personnel at SA-ALC located at Kelly AFB in San
Antonio, Texas. The SA-ALC personnel are responsible
for providing the depot level maintenance for the Air
Force's fleet of EG10 engines.
In order to add greater depth to the engine
maintainability comparisons and provide another view
on maintainability performance, the metric Total Engine
Removals per 1000 Effective Flight Hours
(TER/1000EFH) has been selected to supplement the
UER/1000EFH metric. The Total Engine Removal
(TER) metric combines all reasons for engine removal,
including UERs and Scheduled Engine Removals,
engine removals that had been planned for well in
advance, into one metric.
The sections below illustrate data detailing EG10
family sustainability performance. Some of the figures
present trend lines fitted to the engine metric data to
provide readers with an approximation of the trends for
that metric.  The trend lines were calculated utilizing
functions in the Microsoft Excel© software package.
To allow easier understanding of the data, most of the
information presented in this section will involve the
UER and TER metrics of the EG10-1 and EG10-5A
engines. In some cases, EG10-2 and EG10-5B engines
will be excluded because they are slightly modified
versions of EG10-1 and EG10-5A engines and operate
in single engine fighter aircraft as opposed to dual
engine fighters. EG10-9 engines were also excluded
because the number of operational Air Force EG10-9 is
significantly less than the other EG10 engines, as
illustrated in   Table 1.
UNSCHEDULED ENGINE REMOVALS - Figure 2
illustrates UER/1000EFH metrics for EG10 engines,
including the EG10-2 and EG10-5B engines, as a
function of the fiscal year ranging from 1975 to 1999.
The EG10-1 engine data illustrates that as the engine
system matured, its UER/1000EFH metrics significantly
decreased.  The reason for this trend is that as EG10-1
engine systems matured, their maintainers became
familiar with the characteristics of the engine, such as its
failure modes, thus allowing them to better predict when
an engine needed to be removed. The tendency for the
UER/1000EFH metric to decrease over time can also be
seen with the polynomial data fit presented in Figure 3.
Figure 2: EG10 UER/1000EFH vs. Fiscal Year
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Figure 3: Polynomical Fit of EG10 UER/1000EFH vs. Fiscal Year
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Upon examination of Figures 2 and 3 it is observed
that the UER/1000EFH metric trends downward for the
EG10-1, and to some extent the EG10-2, while the
same metric for the EG10-5A engines trends upward.
Additionally, this metric appears to be converging to an
asymptote of approximately 4 UER/1000EFH for both
the EG10-1 and EG10-5A engine systems.  This
converging behavior is even more visible in Figures 4
and 5 that only plot the EG10-1 and EG10-5A
UER/1000EFH metric.
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Figure 4: EG10-1 and EG10-5A UER/1000EFH vs. Fiscal Year
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Figure 5: Polynomical Fit of EG0 UER/1000EFH vs. Fiscal Year
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This behavior is far from what was expected from
engine systems where overall sustainability has been
improved with each new engine model. If the
sustainability of each generation of EG10 were
improved, one would expect that the UER metric would
trend downward in a similar fashion for each engine
toward a lower UER metric than the metric approached
by the preceding generation.  Figure 6 illustrates an
example of such ideal behavior.  Examination of the
UER metric raises two questions:
1. Why did the EG10-5A engines approach the UER
asymptote from below instead of above like the
EG10-1?
2. Why do these engine systems appear to approach
the same UER metric despite the fact that the EG10-
5A engines were designed for increased
sustainability?
Figure 6: Ideal UER/1000EFH Representation
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In order to answer these questions, personnel at the
EG10 FSO at WPAFB were contacted. The reason that
the EG10-5A engine exhibited a positive UER/1000EFH
slope while the EG10-1 engine had a negative slope lie
partially in how the engines were procured by the Air
Force. The EG10-1 engines were rushed from their
prototype stage into full production in order to quickly
bring, what was at the time, the Air Force’s newest
fighter into operation to counter advanced Soviet fighter
aircraft18.  Due to the rushed production cycle, Initial
Service Parts (ISPs), which are usually reworked for
increased durability before the engine is fielded, were
used in fielded engines thus causing high UER metrics.
However, as the engine grew older, ISPs were steadily
replaced with more durable components through the
CIP. This, combined with other R&M related
modifications, drove the UER metric down until it
approached 5 UER/1000EFH.
Personnel at SA-ALC also mentioned that the EG10-
1's fuel control system contributed to the engine's high
UER metrics since it was extremely prone to failure
because of its over 5000 mechanical parts. In fact, this
mechanical fuel control system still causes many of the
UERs that current EG10-1 engines experience today.
The EG10-5 eliminated this problem by replacing the
original mechanical fuel control system with an
electronic version that used far fewer moving parts thus
highly improving the EG10-5's reliability.
Unlike older EG10 versions, the EG10-5A engine
represented an upgrade to the existing and fielded
EG10-1 engine. Where the EG10-1 was seriously
impacted by the performance of its prototype ISPs, the
EG10-5 engines were built with parts that were meant to
be used in fielded engines thus making the early UER
metrics for the EG10-5A engines low. Although the
EG10-5A was a derivative of the previous EG10, it still
possessed new failure modes that appeared as the
engine gained EFHs in the Air Force fleet forcing EG10-
5A UER metrics to increase. Additionally, the fact that
over time engine components wear out partially explains
why the EG10-5A UER/1000EFH metric increases.
Part wear is also a reason that both the EG10-1 and
the EG10-5A UER/1000EFH metrics approach 5
UER/1000EFH.  EG10-5A components were designed
                                              
18 Drewes, pp. 9
12
to be more durable than the EG10-1 components, but in
order to provide greater thrust; the EG10-5A will often
operate at higher temperatures than the EG10-1.  These
higher temperatures create a harsher operating
environment for EG10-5A components thus countering
increased component durability.  In essence, the harsher
operating environment and added component durability
balanced in such a way that the EG10-5A developed
UER performance similar to the EG10-1 over time.
Another interesting behavior is the tendency for the
EG10-1 and EG10-5A UER metrics to be lower than the
same metric for the EG10-2 and EG10-5B engines as
can be seen in Figure 3. This behavior inspired
investigations that uncovered the fact that engines of
single engine fighter aircraft, such as the EG10-2 and
EG10-5B, tend to have a greater number of unexpected
engine removals than engines operating in fighters with
two engines, such as the EG10-1 and EG10-5A.
In addition to examining the UER/1000EFH metric
against fiscal year, this metric versus total accumulated
flight hours of the entire engine fleet was also examined.
Figure 7 illustrates the UER metrics for the various
EG10 engine variants.  Examination of the data in this
format revealed many of the same conclusions as the
charts comparing UER/1000EFH to fiscal year.
However, the EG10-1 and EG10-5A UER trend lines did
not appear to approach the same asymptote in these
charts, as shown in Figure 8. The TER metrics were
used to further examine the engine removal behavior.
Figure 7: EG10 UER\1000EFH vs. Effective Flight Hours
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Figure 8: EG10-1 and EG10-5A UER/1000EFH vs. Effective Flight Hours 
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TOTAL ENGINE REMOVALS - Figure 9 illustrates the
TER metric for the EG10-1 and EG10-5A engines
measured against fiscal year while Figure 10 measures
that same metric versus EFH. These charts show
tendencies very similar to the tendencies illustrated in
the UER charts, but in the case of these charts, a
tendency for the engines to reach 6 TER/1000EFH as
they approach 106 EFH clearly appears. This behavior
confirms the information obtained from both the EG10
FSO and the personnel at SA-ALC that the engines do
approach a common engine removal metric. This seems
to imply that the engines have similar sustainment
performance as total EFH approaches 106 regardless of
increased sustainment design.
Figure 9: TER/1000 Hours vs. Fiscal Year
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Figure 10: Effective Flight Hours vs. TER/1000 Hours
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION
Judging from the data collected, designing early for
lean sustainment does not necessarily result in more
affordable and agile life cycle options, and a greater
flexibility for technical upgrades throughout the
operational lifetime of a system. The EG10 upgraded
variants did not demonstrate significant sustainment
improvement in regard to the UER metric. In fact, many
of the engines approached approximately the same
sustainability performance, depending on the aircraft
that the engine operated in, despite the increased efforts
by the Air Force and Corporation Alpha to increase
engine sustainability.  This observation is
counterintuitive to what would be expected from
systems that have been supposedly designed to be
more sustainable with each new generation.
The main theory for explaining the EG10 engine
family’s sustainability characteristics is that as the
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engines were modified and components made more
durable the thrust of the engines were also increased
thus countering the added durability.  While increased
thrust led to improved flight performance, the increased
power also required the engine to operate at higher
temperatures when the added thrust was utilized.
Higher temperatures create harsher operating
environments, and, in order to obtain sustainment
performance similar to previous engines, the higher
thrust engine must have more durable parts. If this
theory is correct, efforts to increase durability and
sustainability are countered by owner usage of
increased flight performance.
Based on statements taken from the EG10 FSO and
SA-ALC, there appears to be a balance, at least in terms
of engine systems, between total engine performance
and overall sustainability that must be considered when
designing and procuring complex aerospace systems.
This would imply that one could trade increased
performance for decreased sustainability and visa-
versa.  If such a balance point between sustainability
and performance exists, drastic improvements in
sustainability performance may be possible by adjusting
the system's operations as opposed to improving the
design. For example, a squadron flying EG10-1 engines
may be able to decrease the amount spent on sustaining
their engines by restructuring their flying patterns,
especially during training. This type of conclusion would
suggest that serious attention be directed to how the
squadrons use their engines and if those squadrons are
properly balancing their performance needs with their
sustainment needs.
Another conclusion formed from the research is that
designing sustainability into aerospace systems requires
usage of teams composing of the system value stream
members (e.g. manufacturers, final owners, and
maintenance personnel). The EG10-1 and EG10-2
development programs demonstrate how adversarial
relationships between manufacturers and buyers hinder
the development of sustainable engine systems.
Conversely, the design stages for later models of EG10
engines utilized processes such as IPTs and concurrent
engineering to ensure that all value stream members
communicated effectively and that their suggestions
were considered equally during the system design
process.  The importance of team organizations to the
design of these engines is also demonstrated through
the actions of the EG10 FSO during development of
later EG10 versions.  This group of experienced
individuals guided the later EG10 development
programs and effectively avoided or mitigated many
sustainment problems.
A thorough understanding of the characteristics and
operations of systems must also be emphasized while
designing complex aerospace systems.  In the cases of
the EG10-1 and EG10-2, neither the Air Force nor
Corporation Alpha demonstrated great understanding of
how the engine would be utilized in the field thus leading
to war fighter dissatisfaction.  However, this deficiency
in understanding was corrected during the EG10-5
development program through implementation of new
policy directives and the actions of programs such as
AMT and ENSIP that emphasized accurately predicting
how the engines would be used in the field.
Both the Air Force and Corporation Alpha at least
partially understand the importance of upgradability to
the operation of their aerospace systems.  The Air Force
has programs such as MSIP and CIP that provide
funding mechanisms for modifications to existing
systems.  Moreover, programs such as CALS are
utilized to keep both Air Force personnel and aerospace
industry manufacturers aware of the latest system
requirements and performance metrics.  While
Corporation Alpha personnel stated that the company
understood and designed upgradability into their
systems, this paper failed to find actual evidence that it
made their systems easier to upgrade.  Corporation
Alpha does attempt to improve their products to entice
the Air Force into purchasing new engines and these
newer engines have been thoroughly examined from a
human factors point-of-view, but this does not indicate
an effort to make the engines easier to upgrade.
While this paper does not answer all questions
involving designing aerospace systems for
sustainability, it has offered an insight that, through
more research, can lead to a far more profound
understanding into not only how aerospace systems
should be designed for sustainability, but also how these
same systems should be used.  Additional focused
research on this subject may provide policy makers both
within the Air Force and the aerospace industry with
information on how to better satisfy the needs of the war
fighter and how to cut system operating costs. In
closing, this paper has, at the very least, demonstrated
that system sustainment involves factors beyond
designing for sustainment.
REFERENCES
Camm, Frank. The Development of the F100-PW-220
and F110-GE-100 Engines: A Case Study of Risk. 1993.
Cooper, W.C., Littlefield, A. H., and McCurry, G.E.,
Design Manual for Maintainability/Human Factors
Engineering, Number FR-9607, Revision R2, © United
Technologies Corporation 1996.
Department of Defense Handbook MIL-HDBK-470A,
Designing and Developing Maintainable Products and
Systems, vol 1, August 4, 1997.
Drewes, Robert W, The Air Force and the Great Engine
War. Washington, DC: National Defense University
Press, 1987.
Drouin, Bernadette, "CALS: An Essential Strategy for
Paperless Interchange of Technical Information for
Manufacturing - Current and Future Standards,"
CompEuro '93, 'Computers in Design, Manufacturing,
and Production', Proceedings, 1993, pp. 73 -78.
14
Ellinger, Robert S. When Do You Start to Design R&M
into a Product? Concurrent Engineering, CALS, and the
R&M Engineer,  1994 Proceedings Annual Reliability
and Maintainability Symposium.
Elwood, George, P. "What is CALS All About,"
AUTOTESTCON '93, IEEE Systems Readiness
Technology Conference. Proceedings , Sept. 1993 , pp.
497 -500.
The Engine Handbook: Turbofan, Turbojet,
Turboshaft/Turboprop, Reciprocating, and Small Gas
Turbines, 1991 Edition, Directorate of Propulsion
Headquarters Air Force Logistics Command.
Hoffman, Dennis R, "An Overview of Concurrent
Engineering," Annual Reliability and Maintainability
Symposium, Anaheim, CA, January 19-22, 1998,
Proceedings, Piscataway, NJ, Institute of Electrical and
Electronics Engineers, Inc., 1998, pp. 1-7.
"McDonnell Douglas F-15 Eagle," [Online document],
[cited November 4, 1999], Available at:
http://chan.csd.uwo.ca/~pettypie/elevon/baugher_us/f01
5.html
"Modification Planning and Management, March 31,
1995, Volume 1," [Online Document] Web DeskBook
Edition, March 31, 1995, [cited April 4, 2000], Available
HTTP:
http://web.deskbook.osd.mil/scripts/rwisapi.dll/@WebDA
DSearch.env?CQ_SESSION_KEY=JVTXQLDMUBOE&
CQ_QUERY_HANDLE=124131&CQ_CUR_DOCUMEN
T=2&CQ_VIEW_TEXT=YES&CQ_SAVE[MDI]=YES#FI
RSTHIT
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller),
"National Defense Budget Estimates for Fiscal Year
2000," March 1999.
U.S. Air Force, Aeronautical Systems Division Deputy
for Propulsion, 1982, chart 36.
CONTACT
Spencer L. Lewis
Wesley L. Harris
77 Massachusetts Avenue, 33-410
Cambridge, MA 02139
spencell@alum.mit.edu
weshar@mit.edu
DEFINITIONS, ACRONYMS, ABBREVIATIONS
AFB: Air Force Base
AMT: Accelerated Mission Tests
CALS: Computer-Aided Acquisition and
Logistics Support
CEA: Cost Effective Analysis
CIP: Component Improvement Program
DoD: Department of Defense
EFH: Effective Flight Hours
EMDP: Engine Model Derivative Program
ENSIP: Engine Structural Integrity Program
FJE: Fighter Jet Engines
FSO: Field Support Office
IPT: Integrated Product Teams
ISP: Initial Service Parts
LRU: Line Repairable Units
MMH: Maintenance Man-Hours
MIT: Massachusetts Institute of Technology
MSIP: Multistage Improvement Program
MTBF: Mean-Time-Between-Failure
MTBM: Mean-Time-Between-Maintenance
R&M: Reliability and Maintainability
SA-ALC: San Antonio Air Logistics Center
SPO: System Program Office
TER: Total Engine Removals
TER/1000EFH: Total Engine Removals Per 1000
Effective Flight Hours
UER: Unscheduled Engine Removals
UER/1000EFH: Unscheduled Engine Removals Per
1000 Effective Flight Hours
USAF: United States Air Force
WPAFB: Wright Patterson Air Force Base
